How could they have known that the president had been asleep? When the discussion was at its height, Brezhnev suddenly asked, ``What about not giving any response to the American nuclear alert?,'' and noted, ``Nixon became too nervous let us cool him down.'' Such an alternative was welcomed by most of the Politburo members. He said that no necessary preparatory work had been done. He said, ``The United States will not start a war, and we have no reason to start it.'' Even Grechko agreed that the Soviet army was not ready for immediate military action. Most answered this question with a definite ``No.'' Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said, ``We should not take the road of sending our troops that would mean confrontation with the United States.'' Others added, ``We shall not unleash the Third World War.'' Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin rejected absolutely the idea of sending Soviet troops to the Middle East. The participants realized that the central issue was whether the Soviet Union was prepared to confront the US and engage in a large-scale war. His view was that, in order to save Syria, Soviet troops should occupy the Golan Heights. He insisted that measures should be taken mainly in the military sphere, and he recommended in particular that an order be given to recruit 50,000-70,000 men in the Ukraine and in the northern Caucasus. Andropov said, ``We should have responded to mobilization with mobilization.'' Some recommended reciprocating with a Soviet military alert. His opinion was that the emphasis in the letter was on joint Soviet-American action in accordance with the understanding reached during Kissinger's visit to Moscow several days earlier.Īs for the measures the Soviet Union should take in response to Defcon III, opinions differed. ``The Americans say we threatened them, but how did they get that into their heads? What has that to do with the letter which I sent to Nixon?'' asked Brezhnev.
He and his colleagues characterized Nixon's decision as irresponsible. Brezhnev expressed his indignation at the fact that the Americans had prepared their troops for military action. Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Minister of Defense, and Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB, informed the participants of Defcon III. Almost all of the Soviet leaders took part in the discussion. It was one of the most important of all Politburo meetings held in connection with the Yom Kippur War. As a head of the Foreign Ministry department, I attended the meeting. At 11:30 a.m., Moscow time, an extraordinary meeting of the Politburo was held in the Kremlin. Very soon after Admiral Mourer announced the readiness condition, Soviet intelligence reported Defcon III. This turned out to be a huge miscalculation. ``We decided that going to Defcon III could not be noted quickly enough by Soviet decisionmakers,'' wrote Kissinger in his memoirs. In the course of the meeting, a message to Mr. Ernest Mourer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to go ahead with enhanced readiness. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger instructed Adm. At about 11:30 p.m., a decision on Defcon III was adopted. Nixon at 9:50 p.m., but Alexander Haig told him that the president had retired for the night and refused to wake him.Īs a result, a National Security Council meeting without the president and vice president commenced at 10:40 p.m. According to Kissinger, he tried to reach Mr. Kissinger hastened to inform the president of this message. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger received a message from Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev stating that Moscow was contemplating unilateral military steps in the Middle East. The US decision to move to Defcon III during the Yom Kippur War is well known.
Defcon (or Defense Condition) III, the highest state of armed forces readiness for peacetime conditions, was declared in the name of President Nixon. 24, 1973, American troops all over the world were put on alert. TWENTY years ago the world was on the verge of a nuclear confrontation.
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